In “Why Anything? Why This” (On What Matters, Vol. II, pp. 623-648),
Derek Parfit offers an ingenious line of argument against the insistence that
the existence of the Universe be given a non-coincidental explanation. While I am
on the same page with Parfit about this point, I think there is some larger
issue going unnoticed and that he should have pushed his argument further to a
deeper level.
Let me start from a
ostensibly minor error his makes when refuting the Axiarchic View, which he
formulates generically, as consisting of the following three claims (p. 633):
(1)
It would be best if reality were a certain way;
(2)
Reality is that way;
(3)
(1) explains (2).
Parfit gives (1) and (2) a
pass, and instead focuses on scrutinizing (3):
(1)
is an ordinary evaluative claim, like the claim that it would be better if
there was less suffering. The Axiarchic View assumes, I believe rightly, that
such claims can be in a strong sense true. (2) is an ordinary empirical or
scientific claim, though of a sweeping kind. What is distinctive in this view
is claim (3), according to which (1) explains (2).
While I also think (3) is
problematic [note: for reasons slightly
different from Parfit’s, to which I will return later], I am surprised that
he lets (1) and (2) off the hook so easily, without arguing that the claim that “an
ordinary evaluative claim [like (1)] can be in a strong sense true” and the
claim that “(2) is an ordinary empirical or scientific claim” cannot be both
true at the same time.
To begin with, notice that “it
would be best if …” is a normative/evaluative statement [note: I prefer to use “normative” but since Parfit here uses “evaluative”
I will leave it at that for a moment], and that reality being a certain way
can be interpreted to mean either that reality has a certain normative/evaluative
property, ν, or that it has a certain non-normative/non-evaluative
property, φ. For example, “lack of gratuitous suffering” is a
normative/evaluative property, to the extent that “gratuitous suffering” is a
“thick concept,” whereas “obtainment of rectangular planets” is apparently a
non-normative/non-evaluative property.
Accordingly, there are two ways to rewrite (1)
and (2). On the one hand, we may have its normative/evaluative version:
(1A)
It would be best if reality had a certain normative/evaluative property, ν;
(2A)
Reality has that normative/evaluative property, ν.
Now, since (1A) essentially claims that if a
normative/evaluative condition is satisfied, then a normative/ evaluative conclusion
follows (e.g. “it would be best if reality were such that there were no
gratuitous suffering”), it indeed “can be
in a strong sense true” as it is something that is apt for justification
through a priori reasoning. However, the correspondingly claim (2A) is not “an ordinary empirical or scientific
claim” at all, as it makes a claim on a normative/evaluative, not an empirical,
property of reality (e.g. “reality is such that there is no gratuitous
suffering”).
On the other hand, suppose (1) and (2) are
reformulated as:
(1B)
It would be best if reality had a certain non-normative/non-evaluative
property, φ;
(2B)
Reality has that non-normative/non-evaluative property, φ.
Then (2B) is indeed “an ordinary empirical or scientific claim” (e.g. “reality
is such that there are rectangular planets”), but to what extent is (1B) still “an
ordinary evaluative claim” that “can be in a strong sense true”? The claim that
it would be best if there were rectangular planets doesn’t make sense unless we
supply an account of how the existence of rectangular planets (or likewise
other non-normative/non-evaluative properties) actuates in reality a certain
normative/evaluative property, ν, the possession of which in turn makes reality
normatively/evaluatively superlative.
To be sure, moral naturalists
have long claimed that normative properties are reducible to, or supervene on, non-normative
“natural” properties. To illustrate, suppose you believe that the badness of suffering per se can be explained away
by purely natural facts (e.g. “suffering is no more than the experiencing of
pain, and pain is bad, simpliciter”),
then you could regard the claim that it would be best if there was least
suffering as an instance of (1B) rather than that of (1A). On the face of it
this claim sounds “in a strong sense truth.” But just think about why the
Logical Problem of Evil has been replaced by the Evidential Problem of Evil: if
suffering is a non-normative fact then what really plays the role in normative
argumentation becomes “gratuitous
suffering” rather than suffering per se. Therefore, instead of “it would be
best if there was least suffering” what you would have to prove is “it would be
best if there was least gratuitous
suffering.”
Now you could either acknowledge
that the claim that it would be best if there was least gratuitous suffering is an instance of (1A) instead of (1B), or (as
a staunch moral naturalist) keep on trying to reduce the gratuitousness of suffering
to a set of non-normative/non-evaluative facts, so as to keep the claim as an
instance of (1B). After all, this is what moral naturalists do. – The problem
is, however, that Parfit is himself a
moral non-naturalist (so am I), which means he shouldn’t have accepted (1B)
without questioning from the start.
In a nutshell, the lumping together of (1) and
(2) is misleading (at least for non-naturalists such as Parfit and myself) [note: hopefully I could later return to the
naturalism-vs.-non-naturalism debate & the compatibility issue between
naturalism and the Axiarchic View], and obscures one of the intractable
normative/evaluative assumptions underlying the Axiarchic View.
What, then, does this have to do with (3), and
with the “larger issue going unnoticed” I have alleged? The next post will discuss.
