北大秘史

只是一点读书笔记。

美国参议院：是费力把事拖，还是启动核选项？

2017年4月6日，美国参议院共和党动用「核选项（nuclear option）」，废除了参议院少数派在最高法院大法官任命问题上的「程序性阻挠议事（filibuster）」权。次日，参议院通过了对大法官提名人尼尔·戈萨奇（Neil Gorsuch）的任命，后者将于4月10日宣誓就职，填补斯卡里亚大法官去世一年多来的高院空缺。

参议院内围绕议事程序的这些斗争在外人看来或许无聊琐碎，实际上却是理解近年美国政治的一大关键。我曾于2013年初在《南方周末》撰文介绍「程序性阻挠议事」的来龙去脉，今天借戈萨奇任命一事重新推送；由于从文章发表迄今的四年多里，大到整个美国政局，小到参议院内关于「程序性阻挠议事」的具体规则，都发生了诸多变动，因此今天的推送也相应地在原稿基础上做了一些增补。

三八国际妇女节的五大起源迷思

1975年，联合国首次庆祝三八国际妇女节。然而为什么国际妇女节会被定在三月八日？关于这个问题，几十年来全世界流传着各种各样的迷思，本文聊作考据，予以澄清。

Notes on Parfit, "Why Anything? Why This?" (1)

In “Why Anything? Why This” (On What Matters, Vol. II, pp. 623-648), Derek Parfit offers an ingenious line of argument against the insistence that the existence of the Universe be given a non-coincidental explanation. While I am on the same page with Parfit about this point, I think there is some larger issue going unnoticed and that he should have pushed his argument further to a deeper level.

Let me start from a ostensibly minor error his makes when refuting the Axiarchic View, which he formulates generically, as consisting of the following three claims (p. 633):

(1) It would be best if reality were a certain way;

(2) Reality is that way;

(3) (1) explains (2).

Parfit gives (1) and (2) a pass, and instead focuses on scrutinizing (3):

(1) is an ordinary evaluative claim, like the claim that it would be better if there was less suffering. The Axiarchic View assumes, I believe rightly, that such claims can be in a strong sense true. (2) is an ordinary empirical or scientific claim, though of a sweeping kind. What is distinctive in this view is claim (3), according to which (1) explains (2).

While I also think (3) is problematic [note: for reasons slightly different from Parfit’s, to which I will return later], I am surprised that he lets (1) and (2) off the hook so easily, without arguing that the claim that “an ordinary evaluative claim [like (1)] can be in a strong sense true” and the claim that “(2) is an ordinary empirical or scientific claim” cannot be both true at the same time.

To begin with, notice that “it would be best if …” is a normative/evaluative statement [note: I prefer to use “normative” but since Parfit here uses “evaluative” I will leave it at that for a moment], and that reality being a certain way can be interpreted to mean either that reality has a certain normative/evaluative property, ν, or that it has a certain non-normative/non-evaluative property, φ. For example, “lack of gratuitous suffering” is a normative/evaluative property, to the extent that “gratuitous suffering” is a “thick concept,” whereas “obtainment of rectangular planets” is apparently a non-normative/non-evaluative property.

Accordingly, there are two ways to rewrite (1) and (2). On the one hand, we may have its normative/evaluative version:

(1A) It would be best if reality had a certain normative/evaluative property, ν;

(2A) Reality has that normative/evaluative property, ν.

Now, since (1A) essentially claims that if a normative/evaluative condition is satisfied, then a normative/ evaluative conclusion follows (e.g. “it would be best if reality were such that there were no gratuitous suffering”), it indeed “can be in a strong sense true” as it is something that is apt for justification through a priori reasoning. However, the correspondingly claim (2A) is not “an ordinary empirical or scientific claim” at all, as it makes a claim on a normative/evaluative, not an empirical, property of reality (e.g. “reality is such that there is no gratuitous suffering”).

On the other hand, suppose (1) and (2) are reformulated as:

(1B) It would be best if reality had a certain non-normative/non-evaluative property, φ;

(2B) Reality has that non-normative/non-evaluative property, φ.

Then (2B) is indeed “an ordinary empirical or scientific claim” (e.g. “reality is such that there are rectangular planets”), but to what extent is (1B) still “an ordinary evaluative claim” that “can be in a strong sense true”? The claim that it would be best if there were rectangular planets doesn’t make sense unless we supply an account of how the existence of rectangular planets (or likewise other non-normative/non-evaluative properties) actuates in reality a certain normative/evaluative property, ν, the possession of which in turn makes reality normatively/evaluatively superlative.

To be sure, moral naturalists have long claimed that normative properties are reducible to, or supervene on, non-normative “natural” properties. To illustrate, suppose you believe that the badness of suffering per se can be explained away by purely natural facts (e.g. “suffering is no more than the experiencing of pain, and pain is bad, simpliciter”), then you could regard the claim that it would be best if there was least suffering as an instance of (1B) rather than that of (1A). On the face of it this claim sounds “in a strong sense truth.” But just think about why the Logical Problem of Evil has been replaced by the Evidential Problem of Evil: if suffering is a non-normative fact then what really plays the role in normative argumentation becomes “gratuitous suffering” rather than suffering per se. Therefore, instead of “it would be best if there was least suffering” what you would have to prove is “it would be best if there was least gratuitous suffering.”

Now you could either acknowledge that the claim that it would be best if there was least gratuitous suffering is an instance of (1A) instead of (1B), or (as a staunch moral naturalist) keep on trying to reduce the gratuitousness of suffering to a set of non-normative/non-evaluative facts, so as to keep the claim as an instance of (1B). After all, this is what moral naturalists do. – The problem is, however, that Parfit is himself a moral non-naturalist (so am I), which means he shouldn’t have accepted (1B) without questioning from the start.

In a nutshell, the lumping together of (1) and (2) is misleading (at least for non-naturalists such as Parfit and myself) [note: hopefully I could later return to the naturalism-vs.-non-naturalism debate & the compatibility issue between naturalism and the Axiarchic View], and obscures one of the intractable normative/evaluative assumptions underlying the Axiarchic View.

What, then, does this have to do with (3), and with the “larger issue going unnoticed” I have alleged? The next post will discuss.

最高法院大法官人选的族裔多元性

（10月10日以「特朗普想在大法官人选上讨好少数族裔，可惜已经迟了」为题发表于腾讯大家，部分内容改自「选·美」5月20日及10月1日「会员通讯」。）

「伪造出生证并和变性人老婆一起绑架幼童的同性恋穆斯林黑人总统」

（10月8日发表于网易评论，部分内容改自「选·美」10月3日「会员通讯」。感谢华建平对初稿提出的修改意见。）

September the Twenty-Fifth, Twenty-Sixteen

You're drowned in a flood tide of depression
that flows and flows and flows and does not ebb,
lying in empty heaviness, in wakeful concussion,
the office's floor being a giant spider web.

You jaywalked a thousand times, maybe a million,
fantasizing the kiss of a car, a bus, a train, a chariot,
but you'd promised to take her to the fairy pavilion,
so everytime you'd murder the infidel self and bury it.

Seeded is the longing for a cuddling session, a snuggler,
upon whose knees you rest your head, your eyelids droopier,
a tranquil ocean, its gentle waves of quiet murmur.

林宝的身份政治

1

暑假里的某天，陪林宝去公园玩。走在路上，她忽然说：“爸爸，我不喜欢自己的名字。”

我心里一咯噔，却又觉得自己仿佛早就在等待这个时刻的到来。“为什么不喜欢呢？”

“因为它不好听。”

“哦？那你觉得哪些名字好听呢？”

“Sophia、Cecelia、Rebecca、Emily、Anna、Elsa……这些名字都好听。但是Bumo不好听，怪怪的。”

“怎么会？你知道吗，Bumo这个名字不但好听，而且别致。”

“‘别致’是什么意思——‘different’？”

“Not different, but special – and unique. 你看，你的朋友里有两个Sophia、两个Emily，是不是很容易搞混呀？而且不像这些常见的英文名字，Bumo是有特别含义的。”

“什么特别含义呀？”她抬头望着我。

我于是给她讲《灵乌赋》的故事，看到她眼里逐渐放出光芒。“这就是爸爸给你起名‘不默’的原因。爸爸希望你成为一个正直的人，勇敢的人，希望你长大后，在面对不公正的事情时，能够站出来，发出你的声音，为被欺侮的人主持公道。”

林宝点点头，想了想，又说：“爸爸，我觉得我现在还不够勇敢。我有点害怕，可以等长大以后再勇敢起来吗？”

“当然啦！”我忍不住笑了，蹲下来吻了吻她的面颊，狠狠地搂住她，“当然啦，我亲爱的宝贝。爸爸的意思并不是要让你现在就承担起这样的重担。我们每个人都有害怕、不够勇敢的时候，就算大人——包括爸爸——也是一样的。正因为这样，这个名字才会给你额外的勇气和力量，对不对？”

“嗯，”林宝也搂紧了我，“谢谢爸爸，我喜欢这个名字。”

2

不，这并不是一个“happy ending”式的故事。对林宝这样在美国出生成长的华裔孩子来说，名字只是往后种种困扰的开端。

其实早在一岁多时，她就对身份认同问题有了隐约的意识，比如在公立图书馆里，她会很自然地拿起一本封面上画着一位华裔小女孩的童书，指着说“这就是我”——尽管那时她还不识字，我们也从未向她提示过不同族群的外貌差别。但是随着她的长大，这个问题渐渐变得无可回避。

前些天视频聊天时，爱人告诉我，林宝向她抱怨自己的头发是黑色的，问我这种情况该如何处理。我说可以给她看动画片《花木兰》，以及人物形象更为多元的童书，试试能否冲淡市面上无所不在的“金发碧眼公主”的影响。也可以在讲睡前故事时，抽出她爱的那本太空探秘：“你知道宇宙是什么颜色的吗？是呀，宇宙是广袤深邃的黑色，只有黑得这样幽远，这样沉郁，才能藏得下大大小小无穷无尽的奥秘。你看，你的头发，正是宇宙的颜色。”

但这也只是权宜之计，主流文化之强大（包括《花木兰》中充斥着东方主义审美情趣的人物造型），怎么可能是我们一己之力能够抵御得了的。何况我也担心她的同学之间是否存在有意无意的种族歧视，才会令她对与自己亚裔身份相关的一切，包括名字和发色，这么早产生怀疑。

我们的一位美籍韩裔朋友，今年从耶鲁本科毕业，到中部某州工作。她在电话里向我爱人诉苦，中部相比于东岸，职场相比于校园，种族意识判若霄壤，对她的敌意、冒犯与排斥仿佛构成当地人日常生活的一部分，令她无所适从。

林宝是从心里把美国当成她的祖国的。她会对爸爸妈妈说：“我想去中国玩，但是只能去两个星期，最多四个星期，然后就要回到美国来。”

但是她认定的祖国，会有一天完完全全地拥抱她和所有像她这样的孩子，不再视她们为永远的异乡人吗？

3

林宝是个心思细腻的孩子。这一点不仅仅体现在对自己的亚裔身份。

前两天她发来一条微信语音，没头没脑的：“爸爸，我为什么没有黑人朋友呀？”

我开始没听清，问是怎么回事。一会儿爱人回话说，刚才送林宝去学校的路上，她忽然提出这个问题，爱人一时不知如何应对，于是让她问爸爸。

我愣了一下，使劲想了想，才意识到我们其实是有黑人朋友的。林宝以前的托儿所老师，收养了几个孩子都是黑人，其中还没成年的两个女孩课余时间都在托儿所里帮忙，和林宝特别亲近；托儿所的一位代课老师来自南非，平时一边自学法语、护士和法律课程，一边拉扯一儿一女，去年产下第三个宝宝时，我们带着林宝去探望过；爱人刚到耶鲁时，英语班上有一位加纳同学，暑假去海滩玩时还与他和他的妻儿一道，在灯塔下聊得尽兴。

但是我们平时太忙，疏忽了和这些老朋友的联络，以至于遇到提问，还要使劲想一想，才能记起她们的存在。而除了这些老朋友之外，我们在纽黑文的日常生活圈子——所住社区的邻居、林宝的幼儿园班上、耶鲁的博士生群体——确实很少发现黑人的身影。

隔天，爱人开车带林宝去远郊的公园参加一个大型游乐活动。据说林宝又在玩到兴头上时，停下来忧心忡忡地问：“妈妈，为什么这个公园里一个黑人小朋友都没有？”

地球这头的我又骄傲又难过。骄傲于林宝的善良与敏感，难过于我们对阶层分化与种族再隔离大潮的无力与无所作为。爱人准备周末带林宝去拜访她的黑人朋友，但我们也知道，真正应该做的远不止此。

（本文已授权端传媒及《中国民族教育杂志》等转载）

《选·美》2016年8月『会员通讯』目录

（四月、五月、六月、七月目录）

《选·美》2016年7月『会员通讯』目录

（四月、五月、六月目录）